| Project management frameworks in practice: the | | | | infrequency of project-programme communications |
| C-NOMIS case study | | | | meant that senior management staff were not |
| This article deals with the fourth of the OGC’s | | | | aware of the scale of the problems on the C-NOMIS |
| eight causes of project failure: poor approach to | | | | project. |
| project and risk management. | | | | Summary and solutions |
| The OGC, in consultation with hundreds of | | | | * Ideally, a project management team should remain |
| experienced management professionals and business | | | | consistent for the duration of the project. While |
| experts, has developed best practice guidelines and | | | | changes in staff at lower management levels do not |
| frameworks for project management and risk | | | | usually give rise to a project issue, it is something |
| management. PRINCE2, the project management | | | | that should be monitored and, if possible, avoided. |
| methodology, has become the de-facto standard | | | | Changes to corporate/programme staff can also |
| throughout the UK government, and is the most | | | | usually be absorbed by a solid project management |
| widely recognised industry qualification in Europe. | | | | framework. |
| M_o_R (Management of Risks) provides a similarly | | | | However, changes to senior project management |
| standardised approach for understanding and handling | | | | staff (such as the SRO or the project manager) will |
| the risks to an organisation or a project. | | | | require the investment of time and resources, as |
| Considering the bedrock of project and risk | | | | these roles form the links between the different |
| management support and advice that the C-NOMIS | | | | levels of project activity. |
| project could fall back on, how did the absence of a | | | | * It is not mandatory for senior project management |
| solid approach to project/risk management become | | | | staff to have technical experience in the type of |
| one of the key factors that the NAO identified in the | | | | projects that they manage. Indeed, sometimes |
| failure of the project? | | | | specialists have more difficulties viewing the project |
| The NAO report highlighted several specific flaws in | | | | in terms of products rather than activities, and |
| the approach to project and risk management used | | | | provide less adept than the non-specialists. |
| on the C-NOMIS project: | | | | However, the C-NOMIS project was reliant to a large |
| * Over-reliance on contract staff | | | | degree on the delivery of a complex information |
| Due to a shortage in skilled personnel, the C-NOMIS | | | | management system. The project failed, to a |
| project relied too much on contract staff, which led | | | | substantial extent, because it underestimated the |
| to higher costs, more time spent inducting staff into | | | | cost and complexity of the system. An experienced |
| the project and less staff ‘buy-in’ on the | | | | IT project manager, or an experienced project |
| project. | | | | manager equipped with lessons learned on previous |
| * Inexperienced SRO (Senior Responsible Owner) | | | | major IT projects, might have been better positioned |
| The SRO takes personal responsibility for the | | | | to judge and enforce the scope tolerance on the |
| delivery of the project and any proposed business | | | | project and deal with IT suppliers. |
| changes. The first SRO on the C-NOMIS project had | | | | * Every project should have external assurance, |
| little experience of managing large-scale IT projects, | | | | particularly a project with such a high profile |
| and therefore was perhaps ill-equipped to deal with | | | | (and such a high budget!) as the C-NOMIS |
| the scope creep that allowed the budget to soar and | | | | project. Without project assurance it is impossible for |
| the estimated duration of the project more than | | | | the corporate/programme management levels to be |
| double. | | | | certain that the project is making adequate progress |
| * Risks identified but not properly managed | | | | – as illustrated by the example of C-NOMIS. |
| Although it was recognised early on that the | | | | * Too few senior managers understand project |
| C-NOMIS project was high-risk, there was no | | | | management and there is reluctance by these people |
| contingency budget for implementing risk responses. | | | | to attend PRINCE2 training by these people. This is a |
| * Scope creep | | | | serious problem that senior managers need to |
| Poor change management procedures led to the | | | | address. Project management frameworks such as |
| incorporation of many adjustments and additions into | | | | PRINCE2 cannot be expected to work if the role |
| the original product specification. These changes | | | | assigned to senior management is not performed |
| eventually proved too much for the time and budget | | | | properly. My recommendation would be to send |
| allocated to the project, and C-NOMIS overran its | | | | senior managers on PRINCE2 courses! |
| tolerance levels. | | | | Looking ahead … |
| * ‘Good news’ culture | | | | A poor approach to project and risk management |
| The project manager was the key person reporting | | | | undermined the C-NOMIS project. In my next post I |
| to the programme director, which led to a ‘good | | | | am going to examine the fifth of the OGC causes of |
| news’ culture and an absence of external quality | | | | project failure – too little attention paid to |
| assurance on the project. This, combined with the | | | | breaking down the project into manageable stages. |