Was the Crash of an Icelandic Bank Icesave in the Netherlands Avoidable?

Was the Icesave fiasco avoidable?Communication between regulators
IntroductionIn the European Directive on Financial Stability a home
This article analyses both the risk managementcountry is obliged to contact the host country in
aspects that were known to all market participantsquestion in case of known deficiencies. Strangely
and the risk management regulatory frameworkenough, on request of the DNB to provide more
which existed prior to the Icesave approval by theexplanation about the explosive growth of Icelandic
DNB in May 2009. The aim of this analysis is tobanks and liquidity problems, the FME (Icelandic
attempt to understand whether regulators and thesupervisor) replied in August 2008 as following: "..
DNB in particular exhausted all their means andLandsbanki's business is healthy, capital levels are
analysed thoroughly all information available at thestrong and it performs well in various stress-tests
time of the granting of banking permission to Icesavethat the FME applies." [2].
in the Netherlands.Role of the supervisors in analyzing the market
At the time of the implosion of Icesave the banktrends
had more than 100,000 accounts and more than 1, 7BIn the Basel document regulating liquidity
Euro deposited money, but according to Landsbanki'smanagement it was clearly stated that to protect
plans before the Icesave launch it expected to takelocal entities supervisors have a duty to help ensure
only about 400-500 M Euro by the end of 2008. Itthe resilience of entities within their jurisdiction to
looks like the DNB could do little to prevent theprotect local depositors.[3]
explosive growth of Icesave in the first few monthsIn the later document issued in September 2008 and
of its operations.named "Principles for Sound
Recently a report requested by the Dutch ParliamentLiquidity Risk Management and Supervision" there is
was published by two academics, DeMoor-Van Vugtmore clear description of the role of supervisors with
and Du Perron from the University of Amsterdam.an emphasis on the comprehensive assessment of a
The report presented all events leading to thebank's overall liquidity risk management framework by
nationalisation of Landsbanki (the mother bank ofthe monitoring of a combination of internal reports,
Icesave) in chronological sequence, and analysed theprudential reports and market information. The
actions of regulators both in the Netherlands andmarket information was a missing link in the analysis
Iceland related to the granting of banking permissionof Landsbanki. The main European and Dutch banks
to Icesave. The report was mainly focused on thehad already withdrawn from Iceland by the end of
legal aspects of granting the banking license, with2007 as more reports came in indicating that the
analysis of the European Passport regime and theIcelandic economy and banks grew very fast and the
home/host country model.bubble might burst very soon. The Swap rate of
By granting the permit, Icesave was included in DutchIcelandic banks and specifically Landsbanki were very
Deposit Guarantee scheme, although the homehigh in the interbank market. This means that
country (Iceland) was responsible for regulating thecounterparties have less trust with these banks than
Landsbanki group. The Icelandic regulator primarilywith other banks. It worth mentioning that the Swap
looked into the Group level reports, which wererate of Landsbanki was very high, (see a graph in the
periodically submitted and showed solid liquidityattachment).
buffers and withstood stringent stress tests.So consequently the market knew that something
The fact that the DNB granted the license providedwas wrong with the Icelandic banks, but supervisors
the quality image to the bank. The authors stressit seems were unaware or seemingly ignored the
that the DNB did not have the legal tools to preventmarket behaviour.
the granting of the license, but if it had been handledChallenges in Liquidity Risk Management and Key Risk
less favorably and more time spent analysing andindicators
asking tough questions, the whole disaster may haveIn certain circumstances, firms may also face
been prevented.challenges in transferring funds and securities across
The most important recommendation of the report isborders and currencies, especially on a same-day
that the European regulations should be substantiallybasis. For example, institutions operating centralised
revised, to prevent a situation where a country bearsliquidity management may be dependent on foreign
the risk of failure of a financial institution (via aexchange (FX) swap markets.
deposit protection scheme), but has little power inFor example, if the liquidity reserve of a bank in for
regulating such institution.instance NL is transferred within a cross-border group
The difference between Foreign Branch versusto Iceland where the local entity faces a liquidity
subsidiary explainedshock but the transfer fails to resolve the problem
A branch of a foreign bank is obligated to follow thewithin the group, the local entity in NL is likely to
regulations of both the home and host countries.come under severe pressure and will have no liquidity
Because the foreign branch banks' loan limits arebuffer to prevent failure. In that event, depositors in
based on the parent bank's capital, foreign banks canNL are in a potentially worse position than before the
provide more loans than subsidiary banks. That wastransfer. If however the transfer succeeds in
probably the main reason why Icesave has beenstemming the problem, and there is no reputational
launched as a branch and not a subsidiary.contagion, then depositors in Iceland would be better
The risk management framework prior the grantingoff and those in NL no worse off.
of a banking license to Icesave operations in theA bank also should design a set of key risk indicators
Netherlandsor KRI's to identify the emergence of increased risk
Now let's move on from the legal to the Riskor vulnerabilities in its liquidity risk position or potential
management framework which existed before thefunding needs. Such early warning indicators should
time of granting the banking license to Icesave.identify any negative trend and cause an assessment
Liquidity regimes are nationally based according to theand potential response by management in order to
principle of "host" country responsibility (although inmitigate the bank's exposure to the emerging risk.
some cases, the task, though not the responsibility,Early warning indicators can be qualitative or
of supervision of branches is delegated to the homequantitative in nature and may include but are not
supervisor).limited to:o rapid asset growth, especially when
The risk assessment method used by the DNB calledfunded with potentially volatile liabilitieso growing
FIRM, which is kind of a scoring cards model. On theconcentrations in assets or liabilitieso increases in
basis of the FIRM score the DNB sets the risk profilecurrency mismatcheso a decrease of weighted
of an institution, which can lead either to a light oraverage maturity of liabilitieso repeated incidents of
heavy supervisory regime. A branch office of a EUpositions approaching or breaching internal or
bank has a very small risk profile according to thisregulatory limitso negative trends or heightened risk
model because it can request funds from the motherassociated with a particular product line, such as rising
bank in the EU[1].delinquencieso significant deterioration in the bank's
According to this method the DNB supervises onearnings, asset quality, and overall financial conditiono
liquidity and integrity risks, which were both assessednegative publicityo a credit rating downgradeo stock
as limited. By that time, February- May 2008, theprice declines or rising debt costso widening debt or
Basel II requirements already had to be implementedcredit-default-swap spreadso rising wholesale or retail
and Landsbanki was informed about thefunding costso counterparties that begin requesting
requirements.or request additional collateral for credit exposures or
Let's have a look now at the liquidity risk ofthat resist entering into new transactionso
Landsbanki at that time.correspondent banks that eliminate or decrease their
The original Basel II accord did not include liquiditycredit lineso increasing retail deposit outflows
requirements and a document named "Liquidityincreasing redemptions of CDs before maturityo
Risk:Management and Supervisory Challenges" dateddifficulty accessing longer-term fundingo difficulty
February 2008 was the main source in defining theplacing short-term liabilities (eg commercial paper).
liquidity risk framework.In my opinion many of these KRI's were in red during
In that document the following elements werethe approval period in first half of 2008.
highlighted: liquidity policies, stress tests, scenarioOn December 17, 2009, the Basel Committee on
analyses, contingency funding plans, setting of limits,Banking Supervision (BCBS) issued two consultative
reporting requirements and public disclosuredocuments intended to apply lessons of the financial
It is worth mentioning that one importantcrisis to strengthen bank capital and liquidity
differentiating factor across regimes is the extent toframeworks while harmonising cross-border
which supervisors prescribe detailed limits on thesupervisory approaches. The central purpose for
liquidity risk and insurance that banks should hold. Thisthese revisions is to emphasise the holding of
is in contrast to an approach that relies more onhigher-quality capital and widen the pool of risks it is
reviewing and strengthening banks' internal riskto support.
management systems, methods and reports.Conclusion.
The core sentence is: the application of liquidityIt is certain that that the Icelandic authorities bear
regimes on a local management or legal entity basisresponsibility for the Icesave collapse, but also so do
requires that each legal entity be sufficiently robustthe Dutch and UK authorities for allowing Icesave to
with regard to external shocks. This may require aoperate in their markets without adequate regulation
pool of liquid assets to be held locally, or for eachand supervision of its operations or an appreciation of
entity to have independent access to contingentthe consequences of a collapse (notwithstanding the
liquidity lines.European passport rules that allowed Icesave to
This pool has been requested by the DNB fromoperate in those markets).
Landsbanki but only just before the LandsbankiThe actual CDS spreads, the Basel II working rules
collapsed (September 2008).on risk management that prescribes the DNB to do
Diversity in liquidity regimesan integrated risk assessment, including Landsbanki
Liquidity regimes are affected by policy choices madeand the FX exchange risk, the problems with the
by national authorities relating to the desired resilienceloans of Icelandic banks with the Luxemburg Central
of banks to liquidity stress. Factors include thoseBank, the different 'warning' reports on Icelandic
nationally determined such as insolvency regimes,banking by market participants and the lack of
deposit insurance guarantees, and central bank creditreserves in the Icelandic Central Bank were all
and collateral policies, including intraday, standingreasons enough to at least take more than a formal
facility, or emergency liquidity assistanceprocedural approach during granting the banking
arrangements, as well as the structure of the bankinglicense to Icesave.
sector itself.