| Nobody creates a strategic plan for system-wide | | | | of the 1980s savings and loan crisis) in the U.S. forced |
| catastrophes. Everybody forgot the lessons of how | | | | them to shrink their balance sheets at the end of |
| portfolio insurance magnified the losses suffered on | | | | every day. |
| Black Monday, October 19, 1987. | | | | Only JPMorgan Chase saw the danger. They began |
| In the 1980s everybody managing money took out | | | | unwinding their portfolio of mortgage-related |
| what was called "portfolio insurance." It was | | | | securities in October 2006. |
| software designed to track your portfolio of | | | | Banks, hedge funds and other financial institutions |
| investments. If the market value of one went down | | | | around the world had been buying up the MBS. If |
| by a certain percentage, the software would start | | | | they didn't own some, they probably owned stock in |
| selling it to stop the loss. | | | | U.S. banks that did. Or they'd made loans to banks |
| For one fund, for one falling stock, this is a good idea. | | | | that did. |
| Cut your losses early. | | | | Plus, the world's financial institutions and markets are |
| But when every fund has this same plan, it means | | | | interconnected through off the books derivatives. |
| that when the entire market starts going down, | | | | Most of them are highly complex financial contracts |
| everybody starts selling. So the market kept going | | | | designed to "manage" risk. |
| down. | | | | But remember, that these people think "risk" means |
| Therefore the software kept issuing more sell orders. | | | | "price fluctuation" not "danger." |
| Forcing the market down even more. | | | | So they take out derivatives that arrange their |
| The Dow Jones dropped 22% in one day, and | | | | finances so they will make a profit under almost all |
| automated portfolio insurance was responsible for a | | | | financial conditions. |
| lot of the selling. | | | | I emphasize "almost all" because it's impossible to |
| If you're in a theater and a fire breaks out you know | | | | remove "all" danger from this world we live in. |
| you should run for the nearest exit. What will you do | | | | Therefore, there's always a "highly unlikely" scenario |
| if hundreds of people are blocking your path? Nobody | | | | which, if it happens, will make the derivative |
| on Wall Street thinks about that. | | | | unprofitable. |
| Something similar happened with mortgage backed | | | | These scenarios don't happen often, but when they |
| securities (MBS), collateralized mortgage obligations | | | | do, they cause enormous financial pain. |
| (CMOs), collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and | | | | Derivatives are the financial equivalent of playing |
| structured investment vehicles (SIVs). | | | | Russian roulette with a gun with only one bullet and |
| They were sold to investors and institutions around | | | | 99 empty (that is, safe) chambers. The odds are |
| the world as a safe way to increase their return on | | | | highly in your favor, but if the one bullet is in the |
| investment. | | | | chamber when you pull the trigger, you'll still die. |
| In this case, the problem wasn't caused by massive | | | | On Wall Street, the damage from the crisis was |
| selling, because these securities are not liquid. | | | | dramatic. Not too long ago, Wall Street had five |
| However, their returns started dropping as large | | | | investment banks that were like gods to the financial |
| numbers of home owners around the United States | | | | markets. |
| started missing payments on their mortgages and | | | | Now, Wall Street has zero investment banks! |
| going into foreclosure. | | | | In March 2008 two of Bear Stearns hedge funds |
| Nobody had ever seen so many American home | | | | failed and it was bought out by JPMorgan Chase. |
| owners default on their mortgage debts, but never | | | | In September 2008 Lehman Brothers was forced to |
| before had so many unqualified people been allowed | | | | declare bankruptcy. |
| to buy houses despite no or low downpayments, | | | | However, also in September 2008, Goldman Sachs |
| unverified incomes and poor credit ratings. | | | | and Morgan Stanley were allowed to convert to bank |
| Once the situation started escalating, institutions | | | | holding companies. And Bank of America was |
| holding the MBS bonds found their sales prices | | | | persuaded to buy Merrill Lynch. |
| dropping. Mark to market rules (enacted in the wake | | | | |